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MINIMUM CONTACTS AND CONTRACTS:
THE BREACHED RELATIONSHIP
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,1 the United States Supreme
Court dramatically changed the traditional notion of personal jurisdiction
by shifting the focus of jurisdictional inquiry from physical control to
fairness.' Prior to International Shoe, the Supreme Court limited a court's
jurisdiction to cases involving persons or property located within the forum
state.' The International Shoe Court held, however, that an out-of-state
defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of a court if the defendant has
minimum contacts with the state where the court is located.4 The minimum
contact theory of in personam jurisdiction has had a profound impact on
state courts by significantly increasing the possibility that an out-of-state
defendant will have to defend himself in a foreign jurisdiction.5 Courts,
' 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2 See Nordenberg, State Courts, Personal Jurisdiction and the Evolutionary Process,
54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 587, 594 (1979) (International Shoe shifted jurisdictional inquiry from
physical control to fairness).
I See Kamp, Beyond Minimum Contacts: The Supreme Court's New Jurisdictional Theory,
15 GA. L. REV. 17, 30 (1980) (traditional notion of jurisdiction based on ability to control
persons within state's boundaries). Under the traditional notion of jurisdiction, a state could
acquire jurisdiction over a defendant only when the defendant personally was served with
process while in the forum state. 4. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PRO-
CEDURE § 1065 (1969). The Supreme Court established the restrictive territorial notion of
personal jurisdiction in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877). In Pennoyer, Neff, a California
resident, allegedly owed Mitchell approximately $300. Id. at 719. Mitchell, an Oregon resi-
dent, attached land owned by Neff in Oregon. Id. at 715. Mitchell then won a default judge-
ment against Neff and sold the land to Pennoyer. Id. Neff challenged the sale to Pennoyer
because the Oregon court failed to obtain proper jurisdiction. Id. at 716. The Supreme Court
agreed with Neff because no Oregon official personally served Neff while he was in Oregon.
Id. at 73.
Between the period of Pennoyer and International Shoe, the Supreme Court approved
of several theories of personal jurisdiction that allowed courts to force defendants to litigate
away from home. See generally Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and
the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHL L. REv. 569, 574-86 (1958) (discus-
sion of theories of personal jurisdiction). For instance, the Court approved of statutes that
required defendants to consent to being sued by individuals injured by the defendant's
automobile when the automobile was involved in an accident while in the forum state. See
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927). The Court also approved of jurisdiction over
foreign corporations that did business in the forum if a state required the corporation to
appoint an agent to receive process. See Commercial Mut. Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S.
245, 255 (1909) (foreign corporation liable to suit if corporation appoints official likely to
inform corporation of pending litigation). Under another theory of jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court required foreign corporations to appear in a state and litigate suits unrelated to
the corporation's business if the corporation's activities indicated that the corporation was
present in the state. See Philadelphia & Reading Ry Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917).
1 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see infra text accompanying notes 8-17 (discussion of Inter-
national Shoe).
' See Nordenberg, supra note 2, at 596 (state court jurisdiction has expanded greatly
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however, have disagreed over what constitutes sufficient minimum
contact.' In particular, several of the United States circuit courts of ap-
peals are split over whether a single contract is a sufficient minimum con-
tact for a court to invoke jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.7
The minimum contacts theory of personal jurisdiction protects the
right of a nonresident defendant to receive a fair hearing The Interna-
tional Shoe9 Court concluded that a defendant does not need to be pre-
since International Shoe introduced minimum contact theory of jurisdiction). The reason
that a nonresident defendant can expect to litigate in a foreign jurisdiction is that states
have enacted long arm statutes to supplement the minimum contacts theory of jurisdiction.
Id.; see J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.41-1[3] (2d ed. 1981) (states
enacted long arm statutes to acquire jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who have
established minimum contacts with forum).
A state cannot gain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has minimum
contacts with the state unless the state has a long arm statute. See Prejean v. Sonatrach,
Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1264 (5th Cir. 1981) (state's ability to subject nonresident defendant's
to suit is limited to extent authorized by long arm statute). A long arm statute typically
states the procedure for serving nonresident defendants with process. See Nordenberg,
supra note 2, at 596 n.38 (long arm statutes explain mechanics of serving process). A
legislature may enact a long arm statute expressly stating that the state may exercise
jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by due process. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE
§ 410.10 (West 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (1956). Courts also have interpreted long arm
statutes to extend as far as the Constitution allows. See Hardy v. Pioneer Parachute Co.,
531 F.2d 193, 196 (4th Cir. 1976) (extending South Carolina statute); Walsh v. National Seating
Co., 411 F. Supp. 564, 573 (D. Mass. 1976) (extending Massachusetts statute); Nelson v. Miller,
11 Ill. 2d 378, -, 143 N.E.2d 673, 676 (1957) (extending Illinois statute). States also enact
long arm statutes that are not coextensive with due process. See Masonite Corp. v. Hellenic
Lines, Ltd., 412 F. Supp. 434, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (New York's long arm statute does not
reach to the outer limits of due process); Escambia Treating Co. v. Otto Candies, Inc., 405
F. Supp. 1235, 1235 (N.D. Fla. 1975) (Florida's long arm statute requires greater contacts
for jurisdiction than due process clause).
' Compare Pedi Bares Inc. v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 567 F.2d 933, 937 (10th Cir.
1977) (causing an effect in the forum state satisfies minimum contact requirements) with
Scullin Steel v. National Ry. Utilization Corp., 676 F.2d 309, 313-14 (8th Cir. 1982) (causing
an effect on the commerce of the forum state does not satisfy minimum contacts).
7 See Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907, 909
(1980) (White, J., dissenting) (jurisdiction based on contractual agreements has divided federal
courts). Compare Southwest Offset, Inc. v. Hudco Publishing Co., 622 F.2d 149, 152 (5th
Cir. 1980) (contract is minimum contact); Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 567
F.2d 933, 937 (10th Cir. 1977) (same) with Jadair, Inc. v. Walt Keeler Co., Inc., 679 F.2d
131, 134 (7th Cir.) (contract is not minimum contact) cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 258 (1982); Aaron
Ferer & Sons Co. v. American Compressed Steel Co., 564 F.2d 1206, 1211 (8th Cir. 1977) (same).
8 See 326 U.S. at 316 (nonresident defendant subject to suit in foreign forum if defen-
dant maintains minimum contacts and suit does not unfairly burden defendant); see also
Comment, Constitutional Limitations on State Long Arm Jurisdiction, 49 U. CHI. L. REV.
156, 156 (1982) (International Shoe protects defendant's right to fair hearing). A fair hearing
entitles the defendant to notice and an opportunity to be heard. Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940). A defendant does not receive a fair hearing if he does not receive
notice informing him of what the litigation involves and if he does not have enough time
to make an appearance. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)
(notice requires information concerning litigation and sufficient time to appear).
1 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In International Shoe, the defendant, International Shoe, was
[Vol. 40:1639
MINIMUM CONTACTS AND CONTRACTS
sent in a state for the defendant to have maintained sufficient contacts
to allow a court in the state to obtain jurisdiction consistent with due
process.'" International Shoe, however, limited state court jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants to cases in which jurisdiction over a nonresident
would not usurp another state's right to protect residents against un-
justified litigation."
In International Shoe, the Court outlined several factors for courts
to consider in determining whether a defendant is subject to in personam
jurisdiction.'2 First, courts should consider the defendant's inconvenience
in defending away from home.'" Second, courts should consider whether
a defendant has maintained continuous and systematic contacts with the
forum state and the relationship between the defendant's contacts and
the subject matter of the litigation." Isolated contacts unrelated to the
cause of action do not justify jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.'5
Third, courts should consider whether a defendant's contacts with the
forum state are substantial enough to justify jurisdiction over the defen-
dant if the suit is unrelated to the contacts.16 Finally, courts should con-
a Delaware corporation that did not maintain an office in the state of Washington or ex-
ecute any contracts in the state. Id- at 313. The company, however, did send salesmen into
the state to solicit business. Id. Washington claimed jurisdiction over the company in order
to obtain past due unemployment insurance contributions. Id. at 314.
10 326 U.S. at 316; see Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction: Quality v. Quantity-A
Dilemma In the Fifth Circuit, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 658, 659-60 (1979) (International Shoe ex-
panded notions of jurisdiction by allowing courts to acquire jurisdiction over absent defen-
dants). The due process clause to the United States Constitution states in pertinent part
that "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1.
" See 326 U.S. at 317 (jurisdiction must be consistent with federal system of govern-
ment). Differing views exist concerning what International Shoe's federalism requirement
entails. See Alchemie Int'l., Inc. v. Metal World, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 1039, 1045 n.11 (D.N.J.
1981). Some courts hold that federalism requires only that the forum state have a legitimate
interest in the litigation. See e.g., Empire Abrasive Equip. Corp. v. H.H. Watson, Inc., 567
F.2d 554, 557 (3d Cir. 1977). On the other hand, some commentators have concluded that
the forum state must have a greater interest than the defendant's home state before the
forum state can acquire jurisdiction. Comment, Federalism, Due Process, and Minimum Con-
tacts: World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1341, 1347 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Federalism, Due Process].
" See infra text accompanying notes 13-17 (discussion of factors involved in creation
of minimum contacts).
1" 326 U.S. at 317. The International Shoe Court did not state how courts should deter-
mine a defendant's inconvenience. Id. Other courts, however, indicate that a defendant's
financial capabilities may indicate a defendant's ability to litigate away from home. See
In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 234 (6th Cir. 1972) (unfairness
includes defendant's inability to defend himself in foreign forum).
" 326 U.S. at 317-18.
15 Id. at 318.
1" Id.; see Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446-47 (1952) (jurisdic-
tion allowed if suit arises out of transaction unrelated to defendant's activities but defen-
dant has substantial in state activities).
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sider whether single acts authorized by the defendant are significant
enough to justify jurisdiction over the defendant.'7
In two cases subsequent to International Shoe, the Supreme Court
further refined the minimum contact test for personal jurisdiction. In
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,8 the Court held that a Califor-
nia court had jurisdiction over a Texas insurance company because the
company agreed to insure a California resident, and most of the commer-
cial activities related to the insurance policy occurred in California.'9 The
fact that state boundaries no longer dictate the nature of commercial
activities" and the fact that modern communication and transportation
allow an out-of-state party to defend himself in a foreign jurisdiction
without an undue burden persuaded the Court to approve an expansive
theory of state court jurisdiction." In McGee, the Court concluded that
California was a proper place for the parties to litigate the case because
California had a significant interest in providing the plaintiff with a forum."
The Supreme Court's decision in Hanson v. Dencklae in which the
Court held that a state did not have jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant' tempered the Court's concern for the plaintiff. The Hanson
17 326 U.S. at 318; see Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (accident involving
defendant's car authorizes forum state to assert. j2Aridiction over defendant).
355 US. 220 (1957). In McGee, the plaintiff sought to recover on an insurance policy
issued by the International Life Insurance Co. (International) on the plaintiffs son. Id. at
221-22. The plaintiff and the plaintiff's deceased son were both residents of California. Id.
at 222. International declined to pay on the policy because International claimed that the
son's death was the result of suicide. Id. International did not maintain an office in Califor-
nia or solicit business in California. Id. International's only contact with California was the
insurance contract covering the plaintiff's son. Id. International acquired the contract by
assuming the obligations of another insurance company. Id. The plaintiffs son paid all of
his premiums by mailing his payment from his California home to the defendant insurer
in Texas. Id.
19 Id. at 223-24.
Id. at 223.
21 Id.
' Id. at 223-24. In McGee, the Court held that the California court should have jurisdsic-
tion because California residents suffer a disadvantage if they must travel to a foreign
forum to litigate small or moderate claims. Id. at 223. The Court further concluded that
California was the proper forum for the litigation because crucial witnesses were located
in California and the inconvenience to the insurance company in defending the suit was
minimal. Id. at 223-24.
The court also allowed jurisdiction in McGee because California had a substantial con-
nection with the insurance policy. Id. at 223. The defendant delivered the contract in California
and the plaintiff paid the premiums in California. Id. The Court also noted that the
policyholder died in California. Id.
" 357 U.S. 235 (1958). In Hanson, a settlor created a trust in Delaware by a Penn-
sylvania settlor who appointed a Delaware trustee. Id. at 238. The settlor moved to Florida
and executed her power of appointment. Id. The settlor continued to receive income from
the trust until her death. Id. The settlor continued to remain in touch with the Delaware
trustee while she resided in Florida. Id. at 238-39.
See Jay, "Minimum Contacts" As a Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdiction: A Reap-
[Vol. 40:1639
MINIMUM CONTACTS AND CONTRACTS
Court revived past notions of federalism by stating that the minimum
contact requirement of personal jurisdiction restricts the power of states
to force nonresident defendants to litigate away from home." Hanson pro-
tected the defendant against distant litigation by demanding that the defen-
dant purposefully create the minimum contact with the forum state.1
6
The Hanson Court's emphasis on territorial integrity is a significant
addition to the analysis the Court used in McGeeY In McGee, the plain-
tiff's relationship to the forum state and the state's interest in seeing the
case litigated were the primary factors in deciding if a court could invoke
jurisdiction." The Hanson Court, however, regarded the McGee factors
as secondary and held that jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant was
contingent on the defendant making a conscious effort to take advantage
of the laws and protections of the forum state.2 9
Following Hanson, the Supreme Court did not face an important per-
sonal jurisdiction question for two decades. The due process rights of
nonresident defendants came to the Court's attention in Kulko v. Califor-
nia Superior Court." The Kulko Court relied on Hanson and limited McGee
by emphasizing that a prerequisite for in personam jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant is that the defendant make a direct effort to gain
the benefits and protections of the forum state.2 Kulko held that courts
praisal, 59 N.C. L. REV. 429, 461 (1981) (Hanson used narrow meaning for contacts that
limited jurisdiction).
357 U.S. at 251; see Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A
Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112, 1118 (1981) (Hanson relied on federalism
to limit minimum contacts test).
' See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977) (Hanson's requirement that defen-
dant purposely avail himself of benefit of forum state prohibited Delaware from asserting
jurisdiction over nonresident defendant).
I See Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Commercial Litigation: When is a Contract a
Contact?; 61 B.U. L. REv. 375, 379 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction]
(Hanson emphasized that minimum contacts depend on activities of defendant).
' See id. at 378 (McGee established that minimum contacts test involves investigation
into factors other than defendant's conduct).
1 See 357 U.S. at 252-54 (defendant must act in manner intended to acquire benefits
from the forum state); see also Kamp, supra note 3, at 21 (Hanson is prodefendant because
Hanson emphasized defendant's purposeful activity).
" 436 U.S. 84 (1978). See generally Note, The Long-Arm Reach of the Courts Under the
Effect Test After Kulko v. Superior Court, 65 VA. L. REV. 175 (1979). Kulko involved a cou-
ple who were married in California but resided in New York. 436 U.S. at 86. The couple
was separated in 1972. Id. at 87. The separation agreement provided that the children would
live with the mother in California during the summer. Id Mrs. Kulko subsequently obtained
a divorce in Haiti. Id.
The couple's youngest child requested to live year round in California and Mr. Kulko
agreed to the request. Id. at 87-88. Mrs. Kulko arranged for her other child to join her
in California. Id. at 88. Mr. Kulko did not consent and Mrs. Kulko sued in California to
gain full custody of the children. Id. The California court asserted jurisdiction over Mr.
Kulko. Id.
"' See Nordenberg, supra note 2, at 621 (Kulo relied on Hanson and failed to cite McGee).
The Court, in Kulko stated that a defendant must make a direct effort to gain the benefits
1983] 1643
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should conduct a two-part test prior to invoking jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant." First, courts must determine whether a defendant
has made a direct attempt to gain some benefit from the forum state by
maintaining minimum contacts.' Second, courts must determine whether
the defendant's presence in the court is consistent with the fundamental
fairness considerations of due process. 4 When a court decides the fun-
damental fairness issue, Kulko stated that the court should consider the
interest of the forum state in having the case litigated. 5 Implicit in the
Kulko analysis is the assumption that the greater the forum state's in-
terest in seeing the case litigated, the more minimal the contacts of the
defendant must be 6 A significant state interest, however, is not a replace-
ment for some direct contact between the defendant and the forum state.,
The need for direct involvement by the defendant in the forum state
was emphasized further in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson."
In World-Wide, the Court stated that the defendant has established suffi-
cient minimum contacts with the forum state when the defendant can an-
ticipate that a foreign state may force him to defend himself away from
home. 9 A defendant should anticipate potential liability in a foreign
jurisdiction when he has made an attempt to perform some activity in
and protections of the forum state. 436 U.S. at 93-94. A defendant can satisfy Kulko's re-
quirements only by receiving a direct benefit. Id. at 95. In Kulko, the defendant received
a benefit from California because his household expenses in New York decreased while
his children were in California. Id. The Court, however, rejected the argument that the
defendant received a direct benefit because his decreased expenses resulted from actions
taken by his ex-wife: Id.
' See infra text accompanying notes 33-34 (discussion of Kulko test).
' 436 U.S. at 92-96.
' Id. at 96-98; see supra note 10 (due process clause of Fourteenth amendment).
I See 436 U.S. at 98-99 (state interest is especially important when state enacts special
jurisdictional statute).
"' See Kamp, supra note 3, at 42 (Kulko reasoned that states may reach nonresident
defendants if sufficient relationship exists between controversy and state).
" See Nordenberg, supra note 2, at 627 (defendant must receive direct benefits from
forum state).
444 U.S. 286 (1980) See generally Note, Fairness or Federalism in Supreme Court
Minimum Contact Analysis?: World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 37 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1341 (1980) (discussion of World-Wide). In World-Wide, Harry and Kay Robinson
purchased a new Audi from Seaway Volkswagen in Massena, New York. 436 U.S. at 288.
The Robinsons drove the car on Interstate 44 through Oklahoma. Id. The Robinsons were
on their way to their new home in Arizona. Id. In Tulsa, the Robinsons were hit from behind.
Id. The gas tank ignited and Mrs. Robinson and her two children were burned seriously. Id.
The Robinsons initiated a products liability suit in Oklahoma against four defendants.
Id. The Robinsons sued Audi, the car's manufacturer, Volkswagen of America, Inc., the
importer of the car, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., the distributor of the car, and Seaway
Volkswagen, Inc., the seller of the car. Id. The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that the
defendants fell within the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma long arm statute. Id. at 290.
444 U.S. at 297. The World-Wide Court, in holding that a defendant's actions must
warn defendant that a foreign court may require him to appear, emphasized that the defen-
dant's direct involvement in the forum state was the relevant consideration. Id.
[Vol. 40:1639
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the state." A defendant has not established a contact with the forum state
merely because he indirectly benefits from the unilateral activity of some
other party in the forum state."' The Court also stated that a defendant's
ability to foresee that his actions may have repercussions in another state
is not a sufficient contact with the state for a foreign court to require
that the defendant appear. 2
In World-Wide, the Court concluded that the purposeful activity re-
quirement of the minimum contacts test was consistent with due process
because requiring defendants to associate with the forum state promoted
interstate federalism.43 The minimum contacts theory of jurisdiction
preserves equality among the states because no court can acquire jurisdic-
tion over a defendant unless the defendant voluntarily conducts his ac-
tivities so that he takes advantage of the forum state's benefits."' World-
Wide's concern with maintaining the sovereign status of each state under-
mined the inroads McGee made in expanding the ability of courts to cross
state lines to obtain jurisdiction.45 In World-Wide, the Court adopted Han-
son's analysis that a state's interest in protecting a defendant from foreign
litigation is more important than the forum state's interest in allowing
an in-state resident to have his day in court."6
Although the Supreme Court has refined the criteria for minimum
contacts since the Court first introduced the theory, federal courts of ap-
peals have not been able to agree whether a contract between a defen-
dant and a party within the forum state satisfies the constitutional re-
'o Id. Two theories exist concerning when a defendant should anticipate that a foreign
court can require him to appear. Constitutional Limitations, supra note 8, at 169. Prior
to Kulko, a defendant was subject to a court's jurisdiction if he could foresee a consequence
of his activity occurring in the forum. Id. Kuklo, however, implies that the defendant must
foresee the possibility that someone might sue him in the forum. Id.
41 See 444 U.S. at 299; see Nordenberg, supra note 2, at 627 (minimum contact not
established unless defendant receives some direct benefit from associating with the forum).
42 444 U.S. at 295-97.
'2 See id. at 292 (minimum contacts stops states from reaching out beyond state limits
to obtain jurisdiction over defendants); see also Kamp, supra note 3, at 24 (World-Wide ex-
plicitly values federalism more than inconvenience to defendant). In World-Wide, the Court
stated that an overriding concern of the due process clause was preserving interstate
federalism. 444 U.S. at 292. The Court explained that the minimum contact requirements
of due process could deny a state jurisdiction over a cause of action although the state
had a significant interest in having the case litigated and the defendant failed to suffer
any inconvenience in litigating the case. Id. at 294.
" Id. at 297.
, See Kamp, supra note 3, at 38 (World-Wide limited jurisdiction because granting
expansive jurisdiction to one state necessarily reduces jurisdictional authority of another
state); see also Kurland, supra note 3, at 569 (increasing one state's jurisdiction reduces
another state's jurisdicton).
" 444 U.S. at 293-94. In World-Wide, the Court cited Hanson for the position that
federalism limits personal jurisdiction. Id. at 294. See generally, Federalism, Due Process,
supra note 11 (discussion of World-Wide's use of federalism).
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quirements of due process.47 While all circuit courts recognize that a defen-
dant's appearance must meet due process standards, the circuits inter-
pret the Supreme Court's opinions differently.48 Circuits that favor ex-
pansive jurisdiction depend heavily on McGee.9 The circuits that view
minimum contacts as a vehicle for preserving interstate federalism tradi-
tionally rely on Hanson."0
In In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc.,5 the Sixth Circuit
held that a contract could satisfy the minimum contact requirements of
due process.2 In In-Flight, Van Dusen, a Minnesota corporation engaged
in the distribution of airplane parts, entered into a contract with In-Flight.Y
In-Flight manufactaured airplane parts at a plant located in Columbus,
Ohio., Under the terms of the contract, In-Flight agreed to manufacture
and sell to Van Dusen 1,000 aircraft transponders. In-Flight brought suit
in Ohio against Van Dusen for breach of contract after Van Dusen stop-
ped payment on a check. 6 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio dismissed the suit because of a lack of personal
jurisdiction.,7 The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case back to
the district court.
5 8
The Sixth Circuit limited its discussion to the due process limitations
on personal jurisdiction5 and applied a McGee analysis to determine the
" See Long-Arm Jurisdiction, supra note 26, at 384 (courts divided whether contract
satisfied minimum contacts requirements).
48 See Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907, 910-11
(1980) (White, J., dissenting) (jurisdiction based on contractual dealings divides federal courts);
cf. Mississippi Interstate Express, Inc. v. Transpo Inc., 681 F.2d 1003, 1007 (5th Cir. 1982)
(decisions in other circuits are in such disarray that no reason exists to consider opinions
of other circuits); infra notes 49-50 (different interpretation of jurisdiction based on single
contract).
" See Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 567 F.2d 933, 936-37 (10th Cir. 1977)
(citing McGee to affirm jurisdiction based on single contract); Product Promotions, Inc. v.
Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 496 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing McGee for position that defendant need
not be physically present in forum state to satisfy minimum contact requirement); see also
Long-Arm Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 384 (courts extending jurisdiction based on single
contract rely on McGee).
' See Anderson v. Shiflett, 435 F.2d 1036, 1037-38 (10th Cir. 1971) (citing Hanson for
rejection of jurisdiction based on single contract); see also Long-Arm Jurisdiction, supra
note 27, at 386 (Seventh and Tenth Circuits have cited Hanson to deny jurisdiction based
on single contract).
" 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972).
' Id. at 232.
' Id. at 222.
u Id.
5 Id.
' Id. at 223.
' Id. at 222.
' Id. at 236.
5' Id. at 224; see Didactics Corp. v. Welch Scientific Co., 291 F. Supp. 890, 892 (N.D.
Ohio 1968) (Ohio long arm statute is coextensive with the United States Constitution). In
relevant part, Ohio's long arm statute provides: "A court may exercise personal jurisdic-
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nature of Van Dusen's contacts with Ohio0 Instead of focusing on Van
Dusen's activities in Ohio, the In-Flight court stressed the activities of
the plaintiff." The court noted that In-Flight manufactured the
transponders in Ohio.2 Although the contract between Van Dusen and
In-Flight did not stipulate where In-Flight was to manufacture the
transponders, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that Van Dusen should have
recognized that In-Flight would manufacture the transponders at In-
Flight's Columbus plant. 3 Van Dusen, therefore, established a significant
contact with Ohio by signing a substantial business contract with an Ohio
resident that ultimately affected the Ohio economy."
After the Sixth Circuit concluded that Van Dusen established the re-
quisite contacts for jurisdiction, the court considered whether Van Dusen
would suffer a significant disadvantage by appearing in Ohio. 5 The court
indicated that a defendant is capable of defending himself in a foreign
court when the defendant is involved in interstate commerce. The In-
Flight court noted, however, that interstate commerce is not a replace-
ment for direct involvement in the forum state. In In-Flight, the court
reasoned that Van Dusen should have anticipated that a foreign court
might require Van Dusen to appear. 8 Van Dusen's extensive interstate
dealings gave Van Dusen sufficient notice that it should prepare itself
for litigation in foreign states.9 Another factor the In-Flight court con-
tion over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from
the person's: (1) Transacting any business in this state." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 2307.382
(Baldwin 1982).
See Long-Arm Jurisdiction, supra note 26, at 384-85 (court in In-Flight applied McGee
analysis). The In-Flight court articulated a three-part test that a defendant must satisfy
before a foreign court can obtain jurisdiction. See Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus.,
Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968) (requirements for jurisdiction in Sixth Circuit). First,
a defendant must attempt to perform some transaction in the forum. 466 F.2d at 226. Sec-
ond, the defendant's activities in the forum state must be the basis of the litigation. Id.
Third, the defendant's contacts with the forum must justify forcing the defendant to de-
fend himself in a foreign jurisdiction. Id.
1 See Long-Arm Jurisdiction, supra note 26 at 385. (In-Flight emphasized factors other
than defendant's relationship with forum).
62 466 F.2d at 227.
63 Id.
U Id.
" Id. at 232-36. The In-Flight court, in determining the fairness of requiring Van Dusen
to appear in Ohio, acknowledged that both buyers and sellers fall within the reach of a
long arm statute. Id. at 232-33. The court, however, stated that nonresident sellers may
have to appear in a foreign jurisdiction more frequently than nonresident buyers because
sellers frequently initiate commercial transaction. Id. at 233. The court also noted that the
greater the input the buyer has in forming the contract, the greater the chance that another
state can require the buyer to appear and defend himself. Id.
" Id. at 234.
67 Id.
63Id.
69 Id. In In-Flight, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that Van Dusen's interstate involvement
should have informed Van Dusen that it might have to defend itself away from home because
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sidered was the nature and quality of Van Dusen's contacts with Ohio."
The court noted that a defendant's communications with the forum state
may indicate that a court can require a nonresident defendant to defend
himself.7' In In-Flight, the Sixth Circuit held that a district court in Ohio
would not burden Van Dusen unfairly by requiring In-Flight to defend
itself in Ohio because visits by representatives of Van Dusen to Ohio in
connection with the contract suggest that Van Dusen had an ongoing rela-
tionship with Ohio.2 The Sixth Circuit also stressed that the issue of
fairness must include an investigation into the forum state's interest in
having the case litigated. 3 The In-Flight court concluded that Ohio had
a significant interest in resolving controversies that involve Ohio residents
and substantial business contracts.7 4 In In-Flight, Ohio was the proper
forum for the litigation because Ohio had a significant interest in secur-
ing Ohio businessmen the benefits of their bargains and because Van Dusen
should have anticipated that the contract with In-Flight might result in
litigation in Ohio. 75
The Tenth Circuit also applied an expansive jurisdictional analysis
in Continental American Corp. v. Camera Controls Corp.7 and permitted
a federal district court sitting in Kansas to assert jurisdiction over a
California defendant.7 In Continental, Continental American Corporation
(Continental), a Kansas corporation with its principal place of business
in Wichita, purchased the Pioneer Balloon Company (Pioneer) from Sher-
wood Medical Industries, Inc., a Missouri corporation.7 At the time Con-
Van Dusen had corporate dealings with companies spread throughtout the United States.
Id. The Sixth Circuit found, for instance, that Van Dusen maintained its corporate head-
quarters in Minnesota and its purchasing operations in Missouri. Id.
11 Id. at 234-35. The In-Flight court measured the quality of Van Dusen's contacts with
the forum by trying to determine the significance that both Van Dusen and In-Flight gave
to the contract-related events that occurred in the forum. Id
", Id. at 235. The Sixth Circuit in In-Flight reasoned that a letter or a telephone call
by a defendant to the forum state may indicate that the defendant is involved substantially
with the forum. Id. The In-Flight court, therefore, concluded that communications often
are as reliable as a personal visit to indicate the defendant's connection with the forum. Id.
I Id. The In-Flight court held that inspection trips by Van Dusen to In-Flight's manufac-
turing facilities in Ohio demonstrate that Van Dusen had established a significant relation-
ship with Ohio by showing that Van Dusen had a deep interest in In-Flight's activities in
Ohio. Id. Although the In-Flight court did not consider the negotiations that Van Dusen
and In-Flight entered into in Ohio, the court did suggest that the negotiations could pro-
vide a basis for jurisdiction. Id. at 235 n.26. See Thompson v. Ecological Science Corp., 421
F.2d 467, 469 (8th Cir. 1970) (contract negotiations sufficient basis for jurisdiction).
13 466 F.2d at 232; see McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957).
In McGee, the Court held that California's interest in protecting California residents was
a major reason for allowing the California long arm statute to extend to a Texas insurance
company. 355 U.S. at 223-24.
" 466 F.2d at 232.
75 Id.
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tinental purchased Pioneer, Camera Controls Corporation, a California cor-
poration, owed Pioneer $2,628.79 After the purchase of Pioneer, Camera
Controls ordered another shipment of balloons from Pioneer's manufac-
turing facility in Ohio.' Continental agreed to fill the order if Camera
Controls promised to pay the $2,628.81 Camera Control agreed to Continen-
tal's request and Continental shipped the balloons.2 The invoice received
by Camera Control stipulated that Camera Control should remit payment
to Continental in Kansas." Continental filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas against Camera Control when
Continental failed to receive several payments from Camera Control.'
Camera Control moved to dismiss the suit because of a lack of personal
jurisdiction." The district court denied the motion.8
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court properly invoked
jurisdiction over Camera Controls because Camera Controls maintained
significant contacts with Kansas."' The Tenth Circuit found that the most
important consideration courts must make in determining personal jurisdic-
tion is not the quantity of contacts between the defendant and the forum
state but the quality of contacts. In Continental, the court reasoned that
Camera Controls' contacts with Kansas were of a sufficient quality to result
in Camera Controls taking advantage of the benefits and privileges of
conducting business with a Kansas corporation. 9 The Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that Camera Controls satisfied the quality component of the
minimum contacts test by making partial payments to Continental in
" Id. In Continental, Camera Controls owed $2,628 to Pioneer because Camera Con-
trols thought that Pioneer had double billed Camera Controls for a shipment of merchan-
dise and Camera Controls refused to pay the second bill. Id. In fact, Continental provided
documentation to Camera Controls showing that Pioneer had made two shipments to Camera
Control each for $2,628. Id.
SId.
Id. In Continental, Continental had a difficult time in collecting the money Camera
Controls owed Pioneer. Id. Sherwood Medical Industries, the owner of Pioneer prior to
Continental's purchase, attempted to help Continental by trying to collect the money Camera
Controls owed Continental. Id. Sherwood was unsuccessful. Id.
"lId.
" Id. at 1311.
" Id. In Continental, Camera Controls contended that it sent $6,203.79 to Sherwood
in Missouri and $17,991.61 to Continental in Kansas. Id. Neither of these two payments
ever reached Sherwood or Continental. Id. After Continental filed suit, Camera Controls




,Id. at 1314. In Continental, Camera Controls argued two contentions to defeat jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 1311. First, Camera Controls argued that it never created any contacts with
Kansas. Id. Second, Camera Controls argued that Kansas violated Camera Controls' due
process rights by extending jurisdiction over it. Id. The Tenth Circuit considered the two
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Wichita and conducting telephone conversations with Continental.9
Although Camera Controls never had personal contact with Continental,
the court did not hesitate to grant jurisdiction because the parties could
negotiate the transaction with the convenience of modern long distance
communications.91
The court concluded that due process did not require Continental to
produce and ship the balloons from Kansas.92 As long as the plaintiff is
a resident of the forum state, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that where the
plaintiff produced the goods is unimportant.9 When employees of a forum
state corporation manufacture goods to satisfy a contract with an out-of-
state resident, the Tenth Circuit treats the goods, although manufactured
in a facility outside of the forum state, as though the employees made
the goods within the forum state.94
90 Id.
11 Id. In Continental, the Tenth Circuit concluded that mail and telephone communica-
tions have eliminated that need for an individual to travel into a state in order to conduct
business within the state. Id.; see Note, Aaron Ferrer & Sons v. Atlas Scrap Iron & Metal
Co: A Limit on the Reach of the "Long Arm" of the Law, 22 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 694, 703 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Limit on Reach of the "Long Arm'] (modern communication should
limit requirement that plaintiff and defendant have face to face contact in forum). The Con-
tinental court, moreover, concluded that a defendant can protect himself against foreign
litigation by refusing to conduct business with a foreign company. 692 F.2d at 1314.
See 692 F.2d at 1314. (Balloons produced and shipped from Ohio).
9 Id.; see Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596,
603 n.13 (7th Cir. 1979) (Seventh Circuit expresses no opinion concerning effect of where
plaintiff produces goods).
" 692 F.2d at 1314. The Tenth Circuit has altered its position on personal jurisdiction.
In Anderson v. Shiflett, the Tenth Circuit applied a restrictive analysis and denied jurisdic-
tion over a defendant when plaintiff performed services for defendant in the forum. 435
F.2d 1036, 1038 (10th Cir. 1971). In Anderson, the court followed Hanson rather than McGee
and concentrated on the defendant's activities. Id. at 1037-38; see Note, Long-Arm Jurisdic-
tion, supra note 27, at 386-87 (Anderson court rejected plaintiff's reliance on McGee as mis-
placed in light of Hanson). In Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., the Tenth Circuit
not only failed to cite Anderson but depended heavily on McGee. 567 F.2d 933, 936-37 (10th
Cir. 1977). The court emphasized that Hanson did not modify McGee and that the defendant
established a contact with the forum by ordering goods manufactured by the plaintiff in
the forum. 567 F.2d at 936-37. But see Anderson v. Shiflett, 435 F.2d 1036, 1038 (10th Cir.
1971) (performance of contract by plaintiff in forum does not establish sufficient contact
with forum). In Continental, the Tenth Circuit applied a more expansive analysis and con-
cluded that the plaintiff did not have to manufacture the goods in the forum for the defen-
dant to fall under a state's long arm statute. 692 F.2d 1313-14.
Pedi Bares was a significant decision in the Tenth Circuit because the court held that
due process does not demand that the defendant have physical contact with the forum state.
See Note Civil Procedure - Kansas Long Arm Statute - The Single Contract Provision, 27
U. KAN. L. REV. 135, 139 (1978) (Pedi Bares held minimum contacts do not require physical
contact by defendant with forum). The Pedi Bares decision, moreover, indicates that a court
should consider what is fair for all parties involved in the litigation before the court decides
that a defendant does not fall within the reach of the court's jurisdiction. See id. (interest
of forum, inconvenience to litigants, and basic equities are factors courts must consider
when deciding personal jurisdiction). Finally, Pedi Bares held that the defendant will satisfy
Hanson's availment requirement although the plaintiff initiated all of the defendant's con-
tacts in the forum. Id. at 137.
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The Fifth Circuit is another jurisdiction that applies an expansive
jurisdiction analysis. In Mississippi Interstate Express, Inc. v. Transpo,
Inc.," the Fifth Circuit held that a California corporation subjected itself
to litigation in Mississippi by entering into a contract with a Mississippi
corporation.' In Transpo, a representative from Mississippi Interstate Ex-
press, Inc. (Mississippi Interstate), a Mississippi trucking firm, contacted
Transpo, a freight broker, at Transpo's office in California.' The companies
entered into an agreement requiring Mississippi Interstate to move goods
for Transpo.0 Transpo's only contacts with Mississippi were several
telephone communications requesting Interstate's services, supplying ship-
ping instructions to Mississippi Interstate, and agreeing to contract pro-
visions requiring Transpo to remit payment in Mississippi.99 None of the
shipments that Mississippi Interstate carried for Transpo had a point of
origin or destination in Mississippi.' Mississippi Interstate never received
payment from Transpo and filed suit to recover for unpaid invoices."' The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi
granted Transpo's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.'
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed."3
In reversing the district court, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that per-
sonal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants requires courts to consider
the quality and nature of the defendant's activities in relation to the forum
state.04 The Transpo court held that courts should consider the facts of
each case and not apply a mechanical test.'' Under the Fifth Circuit's
approach to personal jurisdiction, a contract will create a minimum con-
681 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1012.
'7 Id. at 1005. In Transpo, Mississippi Interstate agreed to make 19 shipments for
Transpo. Id. The value of Mississippi Interstate's services was $35,000. Id.
93 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. In Transpo, the court noted that although none of the shipments made by Miss-
issippi Interstate for Transpo had a point of origin or destination in Mississippi, Mississippi
Interstate's trucks did travel through Mississippi either because of routing or because the
trucks required maintenance. Id.
101 Id.
"' Id. In Transpo, the district court dismissed the suit for a lack of jurisdiction because
the court held that the due process requirement of the fourteenth amendment barred
Mississippi from extending its long arm statute to reach Transpo in California. Id. The
Mississippi long arm statute allowed Mississippi courts to assert jurisdiction over any party
who makes a contract with a Mississippi resident that calls for either party to perform
some portion of the contract in Mississippi. See Miss. CODE ANN. S 13-3-57 (1972 & Supp.
1982).
681 F.2d at 1006.
"0 Id. The Fifth Circuit in Transpo considered two criteria to determine if personal
jurisdiction exists. Id First, the court considered whether the defendant had a sufficient
minimum contact with the forum so that the court does not put the defendant at a disad-
vantage by making him appear. Id. Second, the court considered whether the defendant
created the minimum contact through his activities with the forum. Id.; see Product Promo-
tions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 494 (5th Cir. 1974) (articulation of test).
"1 681 F.2d at 1006.
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tact with the forum state if the defendant can foresee that the contract
will cause business activity in the forum state. 116 The Transpo court noted
that the defendant does not have to act within the forum state to create
a minimum contact."7 A nonresident defendant will satisfy the due pro-
cess requirements of jurisdiction in the Fifth Circuit whenever the defen-
dant engages in an activity that affects the forum state.' 8
The Fifth Circuit determined that Transpo purposefully established
contacts in Mississippi because Mississippi Interstate performed a signifi-
cant portion of the contract in Mississippi." The Transpo Court, therefore,
applied an analysis similar to the Supreme Court's analysis in McGee."'
In McGee, the Court focused on the plaintiffs behavior."' In Transpo, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that Transpo's relationship with Mississippi was
not fortuitous because Transpo should have anticipated that Mississippi
Interstate would perform a substantial part of the contract in Mississippi."'
The Fifth Circuit's analysis implies that a defendant is subject to a foreign
"' Id. at 107; see Marathon Metallic Bldg. Co. v. Mountain Empire Constr. Co., 653
F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1981) (defendant takes affirmative act and establishes contact when
he causes forseeable business activity in forum).
10 681 F.2d at 1008-09; see Southwest Offset, Inc. v. Hudco Publishing Co., Inc., 622
F.2d 149, 152 (5th Cir. 1980) (jurisdiction allowed over Alabama defendant who never visited
Texas and where part of contract completed in Alabama).
108 681 F.2d at 1007. By causing a foreseeable effect in the forum, the defendant avails
himself of the benefits and protections of the forum. Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d
1260, 1268 (5th Cir. 1981). When the defendant causes a foreseeable consequence in the
forum, a court does not offend due process by requiring the defendant to appear. Id. The
defendant has no due process claim because his actions have given him constructive notice
that he may have to appear in a foreign court. Id. at 1269 n.16. In Transpo, the Fifth Circuit
verified a commentator's belief that the court was prepared to uphold personal jurisdiction
over a defendant if the defendant had contact with the forum through the use of mass
communications. See Note, Constitutional Law, 10 TEx. INT'L L.J. 375, 381 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Constitutional Law] (after Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, interstate
communications may justify jurisdiction). In Transpo, most of the defendant's contacts were
the result of interstate communications. See supra text accompanying note 99 (list of Transpo's
contacts with Mississippi).
109 681 F.2d at 1009. In Transpo, the court concluded that Transpo was an active par-
ticipant in the transaction. Id. The court found that Transpo initiated all shipments, exer-
cised control over the shipments, maintained a sustained relationship with the plaintiff,
and expected plaintiff to perform in the forum. Id.
110 See 681 F.2d at 1008 (Fifth Circuit using Hudco to decide Transpo). In Southwest
Offset, Inc. v. Hudco Publishing Co., 622 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1980), the Fifth Circuit relied
heavily on a prior decision in Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.
1974). The Fifth Circuit in Cousteau decided the personal jurisdiction question by applying
a McGee analysis. See Product Promotions v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 498 n.27 (5th Cir. 1974)
(Fifth Circuit used McGee to find personal jurisdiction in Cousteau); see also Note, Constitu-
tional Law, supra note 108, at 380 (Cousteau continues trend in McGee towards reducing
minimum contact requirements); Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 385-86
(Cousteau stressed and relied on McGee).
"' See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (discussion of McGee).
11. See 681 F.2d at 1009 (defendant knew that plaintiff had only one place of business
to satisfy contract).
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court's jurisdiction whenever the plaintiff performs some portion of the
contract in the foreign state."1 The defendant assumes the burden of
litigating in a foreign jurisdiction by entering into a contract with a resi-
dent of the forum.1 In the Fifth Circuit, the defendant's only opportunity
to avoid litigation in an undesirable forum is to refuse to enter into a
contract with a party who does business in the forum.' 5
In-Flight, Continental, and Transpo are characteristic of the approach
courts use to gain jurisdiction over nonresident defendants involved in
contract disputes."6 These courts do not give state boundaries much legal
significance."' Courts that favor expansive personal jursidiction focus at-
tention on the fact that the defendant purposely entered into a contract
with an individual who resides in a foreign jurisdiction."8 These courts
are in agreement that a single contract is a sufficient basis for jurisdic-
tion because the defendant by entering into the contract has received
benefits from the forum state."' First, the defendant receives the benefit
of the plaintiffs performance of the contract in the forum state."0 Second,
the defendant receives the economic benefit of a contract signed by a resi-
dent of the forum state.'2' These courts also emphasize the forum state's
interest in having the case litigated.'" Finally, courts that favor expan-
11 See id. at 1007 (defendant creates minimum contact when defendant agrees to con-
tract that has business effect in forum).
' See id. at 1008 (defendant can eliminate reach of foreign jurisdiction by severing
contact with jurisdiction).
It' Id.
116 See, e.g., Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 567 F.2d 933, 937 (10th Cir.
1977); Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 494-99 (5th Cir. 1974).
x" See Continental Am. Corp. v. Camera Controls Corp., 692 F.2d 1309, 1314 (10th Cir.
1982) (significance of state boundaries limited by modern communications); Mississippi In-
terstate Express, Inc. v. Transpo, Inc., 681 F.2d 1003, 1011 (5th Cir. 1982) (jurisdiction granted
because of interstate communications).
118 See Mississippi Interstate Express, Inc. v. Transpo, Inc., 681 F.2d 1003, 1008 (5th
Cir. 1982) (rule in Fifth Circuit is that contract with forum state resident requiring some
performance in jurisdiction is sufficient basis for jurisdiction).
11 See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text (discussion of benefits that defendant
receives).
" See Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 567 F.2d 933, 937 (10th Cir. 1977)
(defendant receives benefit of forum state's laws and protections when performance of con-
tract takes place in forum).
21 See, e.g., In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 227 (6th Cir.
1972) (court considered benefit defendant received from substantial contract). See generally,
Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 384-85 (benefit defendant receives from
contract).
11 See Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. v. Delta Int'l Corp., 696 F.2d 1062, 1067 (4th Cir.
1982) (interest of forum state is relevant factor for court to consider when deciding per-
sonal jurisdiction); Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 567 F.2d 933, 937 (10th Cir.
1977) (forum's interest in providing residents with protection against nonresidents who breach
contracts is important factor in determining jurisdiction); In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van
Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 232 (6th Cir. 1972) (extent of forum state's interest important
factor in determining fairness of requiring defendant to appear).
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sive notions of personal jurisdiction recognize that modern means of
transportation and communication enable nonresident defendants to
litigate away from home without suffering an unjustified burden."=
Parties who are reluctant to subject themselves to foreign litigation
are left with two alternatives.'24 The first alternative is for an individual
to avoid all possibilities of foreign litigation by refusing to enter into a
contractual relationship with someone who resides in a foreign state."=
The second and more practical alternative is for the parties to stipulate
in the contract which forum will hear controversies concerning the
contract.'26 In order for a court to enforce the forum selection clause in
the contract, the provision must be free of fraud and coercion."
Courts that favor restrictive personal jurisdiction adhere to notions
of federalism and pay particular attention to the defendant's activities
within the forum state.'28 The Seventh Circuit applied a restrictive
minimum contacts analysis in Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain
State Construction Co. 2' In Lakeside, an agent from Lakeside Bridge &
Steel Co. (Lakeside) visited the offices of Mountain State in Charleston,
West Virginia."' Lakeside, a Wisconsin corporation, maintained its business
in Milwaukee.'' Mountain State was constructing a dam and reservoir
in Virginia, and Lakeside hoped to sell structural assemblies to Mountain
State." Mountain State sent a purchase order to Lakeside for structural
assemblies. 3 3 Throughout the course of contract negotiations, both
Lakeside and Mountain State initiated telephone and mail communications
with each other.'" Although the contract did not stipulate where Lakeside
was to produce the goods, Lakeside manufactured the assemblies at its
131 See Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. Delta Int'l Corp., 696 F.2d 1062, 1067 (4th Cir. 1982)
(California corporation not unfairly inconvenienced if forced to litigate in North Carolina).
124 See In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 234 n.24 (6th Cir.
1972); see infra text accompanying notes 125-27; (two alternatives explained).
125 Id.
' Id. In MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. the United States Supreme Court upheld
a contract that contained a forum selection clause. 407 U.S. 1, 8 (1972). Although the Court's
opinion in Zapata was limited to admiralty jurisdiction and involved an international com-
mercial transaction, the analysis used by the Court seems to apply in cases where parties
want to specify in a contract which court will settle disputes. See Bense v. Interstate Bat-
tery Sys. of America, 683 F.2d 718, 721 (2d Cir. 1982) (no reason to limit Zapata's holding
to admirality or domestic suits); In-Flight Device Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d
220, 234 n.24 (6th Cir. 1972) (principles in Zapata apply in domestic choice of forum questions).
11 See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 n.14 (1974) (forum selection clause
not enforceable if product of fraud or coercion).
128 See Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 385-87 (courts denying jurisdic-
tion pay close attention to defendant's direct contacts with forum).
12 595 F2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979). cert. denied 445 U.S. 407 (1980).
130 Id. at 598.
131 Id. at 597.
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plant in Wisconsin.1 15 Mountain Sate withheld payment after discovering
that the goods were defective. ' Lakeside brought suit in a Wisconsin
state court to recover the money Mountain State owed on the contract.' 3'
Mountain State removed the case to the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin and moved to dismiss for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction.'38 The district court denied Mountain State's motion.'39
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court and dismissed the suit. 4 '
In Lakeside, the Seventh Circuit held that a single contract is not a
sufficient minimum contact to allow a court located in Wisconsin to assert
jurisdiction over a West Virginian defendant.' The court reached the
result in Lakeside by citing Hanson as the controlling authority in cases
involving in personam jurisdiction.' The Lakeside court reasoned that
McGee was inappropriate because the Supreme Court intended courts to
apply McGee in the limited cases in which the state had a special interest
in the subject matter of the litigation.4 3 Under the Seventh Circuit's in-
terpretation of Hanson, Mountain State did not conduct business inside
Wisconsin.' Unlike courts applying an expansive jurisdictional analysis,
the Lakeside court did not consider Lakeside's performance of the con-
tract in Wisconsin as creating a link between Mountain State and






,' Id. at 597.
"4 Id. at 603; see Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction, supra note 27 at 387 (single contract
does not establish minimum contact). The Lakeside court decided that the district court
lacked jurisdiction by applying a demanding standard for determining minimum contacts.
See Note, Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co.: Inflexible Ap-
plication of Long-Arm Jurisdiction Standards to the Nonresident Purchaser, 75 Nw. U. L.
REV. 345, 346 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Inflexible Application] (Seventh Circuit ap-
plied demanding minimum contacts analysis). Lakeside argued that Mountain State was
amenable to suit in Wisconsin because Mountain State ordered goods from a Wisconsin
corporation, and Mountain State should have anticipated that Lakeside would manufacture
the goods in Wisconsin. 597 F.2d at 600. Lakeside also contended that Mountain State had
established minimum contacts by initiating communication with Lakeside in Wisconsin during
contract negotiations. Id. The Lakeside court rejected plaintiffs argument and held that
the plaintiff acted unilaterally although Mountain State could have anticipated that Lakeside
would produce the goods in Wisconsin. Id. at 603.
"' See Kamp, supra note 3, at 44-45 (Seventh Circuit's jurisdictional approach restricts
state jurisdiction); Note, In-Flexible Application, supra note 141, at 351 (Lakeside relied on
Hanson in finding that defendant's activity in forum did not constitute minimum contacts);
Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction, supra note 26, at 386-87 (Lakeside denied jurisdiction by em-
phasizing Hanson's purposefully avail requirement).
"I See 597 F.2d at 600 n.6 (McGee applicable only in cases in which state has extraor-
dinary interest in resolving dispute).
. See id. at 603 (contacts in Lakeside unilateral and performed by plaintiff).
14 See Note, In-Flexible Application, supra 141, at 358-59 (court would have reached
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trol over where Lakeside would perform the contract and therefore Moun-
tain State had only a fortuitous contact with Wisconsin. 146
In Lakeside, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the most important
factor for a court to consider when deciding a personal jurisdiction ques-
tion is the quality of the defendant's purposeful contacts with the forum
state.14 The Seventh Circuit, therefore, failed to consider Wisconsin's in-
terest in providing residents with protection against breached contracts. 48
Furthermore, the Lakeside court did not consider the value of the con-
tract or Mountain State's communications with Lakeside in Wisconsin.
4
1
Circuits that apply an expansive jurisdictional analysis rely on McGee and
consider the interest of the forum state when determining whether a court
is treating a defendant unfairly by requiring him to defend away from
home. 0
The Eighth Circuit followed Lakeside's reasoning in Scullin Steel Co.
v. National Railway Utilization Corp."' In Scullin Steel, an officer of Scullin
Steel, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Missouri, traveled to Philadelphia to solicit a sales contract from National
different result if Seventh Circuit had considered plaintiffs performance in forum); see also
Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 567 F.2d 933, 937 (10th Cir. 1977) (jurisdiction
granted where defendant's major contact with forum was plaintiffs manufacturing goods
in state).
... 597 F.2d at 603. The Lakeside court refused to conclude that a contract requiring
plaintiff to perform contract in forum state would constitute a contact between the defen-
dant and the forum. Id. at 603 n.13.
1. See 597 F.2d at 601 (whether jurisdiction exists depends on whether defendant pur-
posely avails himself of forum state's benefits); see also Wisconsin Electrical Mfg. Co. v.
Pennant Prods., Inc., 619 F.2d 676, 677-78 (7th Cir. 1980) (jurisdiction based on contract
requires defendant to conduct activities in forum related to performance of contract). By
emphasizing the defendant's actions, the Lakeside court refused to conclude that a contract
requiring plaintiff to perform contract in forum created a link between the defendant and
the forum. 597 F.2d at 603 n.13. If the Lakeside court had considered Lakeside's perfor-
mance of the contract in Wisconsin as a link between Mountain State and Wisconsin, the
Seventh Circuit would have found a sufficient minimum contact for jurisdiction. Note, In-
flexible Application, supra 141, at 358-59; see Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc.,
567 F.2d 933, 937 (10th Cir. 1977) (jurisdiction granted when defendant's major contact with
forum was plaintiffs manufacturing goods in state).
148 See Note, Inflexible Application, supra note 141, at 358-59 (Lakeside did not consider
Wisconsin's interest). But see Froning & Deppe, Inc., v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 695 F.2d 289, 293 (7th Cir. 1982) (state's interest relevant consideration in deciding
jurisdiction).
149 See 597 F.2d at 604 (value of contract and interstate communications unimportant
for jurisdictional purposes); see also Inflexible Application, supra note 141 at 352-53 (Lakeside
failed to discuss value of contract). Although interstate communications by the defendant
to the forum state will not cause the defendant to fall within the forum state's jurisdiction,
a visit by the defendant to the forum state in connection with a contract will result in
the defendant subjecting himself to the forum state's jurisdiction. Wisconsin Elec. Mfg.
Co., Inc. v. Pennant Prods., Inc., 619 F.2d 676, 677 (7th Cir. 1980).
150 See supra note 122 (discussion of courts considering forum state's interest when
deciding jurisdiction).
151 676 F.2d 309 (8th Cir. 1982).
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Railway Utilization Corp. (NRUC), a company that manufactures and leases
railroad cars. 52 Scullin Steel was successful in obtaining a contract and
NRUC agreed to purchase a number of car sets."' No NRUC employee
visited Missouri in connection with the agreement.' Scullin Steel's only
plant to produce the car sets was located in Missouri."' NRUC remitted
all payments to Missouri."6 A conflict developed between NRUC and
Scullin Steel and NRUC refused to pay for all of the car sets listed in
the contract."' Scullin Steel filed a suit for breach of contract against
NRUC in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri.'58 NRUC moved to dismiss the suit for a lack of personal
jurisdiction."' The district court granted the motion'6 ' and the Eighth Cir-
cuit affirmed.'6 '
The Eighth Circuit rejected the reasoning of other circuits that have
upheld jurisdiction in similar factual situations and held that NRUC did
not perform any act in Missouri that established a minimum contact.'6'
In Scullin Steel, the court strictly interpreted Hanson's requirement that
the defendant avail himself of the benefits and protections of the forum
state.'6 ' The Eighth Circuit reasoned that NRUC did not avail itself of
Missouri's protections merely because Scullin Steel performed part of the
contract in Missouri.'" According to the court's opinion in Scullin Steel,
a defendant forms a connection with the forum state by direct contacts
with the forum.'6 ' Under the Eighth Circuit's approach in Scullin Steel,








' Scullin Steel Co. v. Nat'l Ry. Utilization Corp., 520 F.2d Supp. 383, 388 (ED. Mo. 1981).
161 676 F.2d at 310.
",Id. at 311. In Scullin Steel, the plaintiff argued that the plaintiff was subject to
Missouri's jurisdiction because the defendant transacted business in Missouri. Id. The defen-
dant's contacts were similar to the contacts in Transpo. See Mississippi Interstate Express,
Inc. v. Transpo, Inc., 681 F.2d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1982) (contract performed in forum at
plaintiff's only facility and payment remitted to forum state). The Transpo court granted
jurisdiction. 681 F.2d at 1012. The court in Scullin Steel denied jurisdiction. 676 F.2d at 310.
"' See 676 F.2d at 313 (court applying Hanson to deny jurisdiction). In Scullin Steel,
the Eighth Circuit relied extensively on Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Diversified Metals Corp.,
564 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1977); see 676 F.2d at 313-14 (citing Aaron Ferer). In Aaron Ferer,
the court based its decision on a restrictive Hanson analysis. See 564 F.2d at 1215-16 (Han-
son's territorial limitations denied jurisdiction).
'' See 676 F.2d at 313 (court rejecting Scullin Steers argument that minimum contact
existed between NRUC and Missouri because Scullin Steel performed contract in Missouri).
.. See id. (defendant's direct contacts with forum are basis for personal jurisdiction).
The analysis the Eighth Circuit used in Scullin Steel is similar to the approach the court
used in earlier cases in which the court required sufficient business contact with the forum
so that the defendant was constructively present in the state. See Note, Limit on the Reach
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a court will deny a defendant due process if a court forces a defendant
to appear merely because the defendant could have foreseen that the con-
tract would have some impact on the forum state's economy. 6 The Eighth
Circuit, moreover, places a premium on the defendant's physical presence
in the forum."7 Unlike other circuits, the Eighth Circuit does not consider
communications with the forum state or payments sent to the forum state
sufficient to justify requiring the defendant to appear in a foreign
jurisdiction.'68
Circuits that deny courts jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
whose only contact with the forum is a single contract base their restric-
tive analysis on federalism."9 As Lakeside and Scullin Steel indicate, courts
that deny jurisdiction on the basis of a single contract require plaintiffs
to demonstrate that the defendant has made an affirmative act within
the forum.' Circuits that believe that the due process clause requires
courts to give state boundaries great significance refuse to place much
importance on where the parties perform the contract or on interstate
communications between the parties.' These circuits, however, are will-
ing to grant jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, if the defendant
traveled into the forum because of the contract.' A restrictive jurisdic-
tional analysis, moreover, encourages courts to focus primarily on the
defendant's interests and not on the interests of the forum state to have
the controversy settled within the forum.'
Although the restrictive jurisdictional approach seems consistent with
Hanson and its progeny,'74 the basic premise upon which courts base the
of the "Long Arm" supra note 91 at 701 (Eighth Circuit requires defendant to establish
constructive presence in forum).
" See 676 F.2d at 313 n.5 (foreseeability of impact on forum does not justify jurisdic-
tion). In Scullin Steel, the court did not express an opinion if a contract requiring the plain-
tiff to perform in forum would establish a minimum contact between the defendant and
the forum. Id.
167 See id. at 314 (defendant's use of interstate facilities has little significance on jurisdic-
tion question).
"I Compare id. (communications and payments to forum are insignificant jurisdictional
factors) with Mississippi Interstate Express, Inc., v. Transpo, Inc., 681 F.2d 1003, 1005 (5th
Cir. 1982) (communications and payments significant jurisdictional factors).
169 See Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 385-87 (courts denying jurisdic-
tion base their analysis on Hanson's federalism requirements).
"I See supra text accompanying notes 144-46 (discussion of Lakeside's requirement that
defendant act affirmatively in forum); supra test accompanying notes 164-66 (discussion of
Scullin Steel's requirement that defendant affirmatively act in forum).
"I See Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., Inc., 597 F.2d 596,
601 (7th Cir. 1979) (partial performance by plaintiff in forum does not justify jurisdiction
over defendant); Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron, 558 F.2d 450, 455 (8th Cir.
1977) (interstate communications do not constitute sufficient basis for jurisdiction).
17 See Wisconsin Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Pennant Prods., Inc., 619 F.2d 676, 677 (7th Cir.
1980) (contract related visit by defendant to forum justifies jurisdiction).
" See supra text accompanying note 148 (court not considering forum state's interest).
174 See supra text accompanying note 169 (courts applying restrictive analysis rely on
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restrictive analysis is flawed."5 The Supreme Court predicated Hanson's
requirement that the defendant must avail himself of benefits of the forum
state on the belief that the due process clause contains an element of
federalism. Courts therefore must respect the sovereignty of other states
when deciding whether to grant personal jurisdiction."" No authority ex-
ists in the Constitution, however, for allowing concepts of federalism to
limit the reach of personal jurisdiction.' In Insurance Corp. of Ireland,
LTD v. Campagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,"8 the Supreme Court concluded
that the due process clause, which is the only source of the personal
jurisdiction requirement, contained no federalism component.' 9 The Court
further reasoned that if a federalism requirement existed in personal
jurisdiction, a defendant could not waive jurisdiction because an individual
may not waive the sovereign power of a state.'80
Since personal jurisdiction protects defendants against a court's un-
Hanson's use of federalism). The Supreme Court consistently has emphasized Hanson's
federalism requirements when deciding cases involving personal jurisdiction questions. See
supra text accompanying notes 31 & 32 (discussion of Hanson's federalism requirement
in Kulko); supra text accompanying notes 43-46 (discussion of Hanson's federalism re-
quirements in World-Wide). See generally Comment, Federalism, Due Process, supra, note
11, at 1349-52 (discussion of Court's emphasis of Hanson's federalism requirements in jurisdic-
tion cases).
175 See generally Redish, supra note 25, at 1113-25 (Hanson's federalism component of
jurisdiction has no basis in due process clause).
171 Id. at 1113-14. The Supreme Court consistently has based personal jurisdiction deci-
sions on the premise that the due process clause protects interstate sovereignty. Id. The
Court's use of federalism in personal jurisdiction cases has infringed on each state's right
to decide cases that affect the state because the notion of interstate federalism drastically
limits the reach of state court jurisdiction. Id. Since Hanson, the Court has used federalism
to limit the autonomy of state courts that desire to assert expansive notions of personal
jurisdiction. Id. at 1118; see Comment, Federalism, Due Process, supra note 11, at 1350 (many
courts use Hanson to require forum to have physical power before asserting jurisdiction).
1 See Redish, supra note 25 at 1113-14 (no foundation in due process clause for infus-
ing federalism into personal jurisdiction determination).
,, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
1 See 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 n.10 (due process has no federalism component limiting
sovereign power of court). Justice Powell in his dissent in Campagnie des Bauxites reasoned
that the Campagnie des Bauxites decision had changed the basis of personal jurisdiction.
Id. at 714 (Powell, J., dissenting). According to Powell, Campagnie des Bauxites defines per-
sonal jurisdiction in terms of fair play. Id. Fairness in the jurisdictional setting refers to
protection against inconvenient litigation, and courts determine fairness by considering the
interests of the defendant, the forum, and the plaintiff. Kamp, supra note 3, at 24. By stressing
fairness, the Court in Campagnie des Bauxites is reaffirming the rational of opinions that
rely on McGee because McGee used a multifactor analysis that emphasized fairness. Id. at
34-35. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Campagnie des Bauxites has lowered the standard
that courts have to apply to determine personal jurisdiction. See Burstein v. State Bar of
California, 693 F.2d 511, 518 n.12. (5th Cir. 1982) (prior Fifth Circuit opinions used more
stringent standards than required by Campagnie des Bauxites).
'" See 456 U.S. at 702-03 n.10 (federalism not part of due process because person can
waive personal jurisdiction without state's consent).
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constitutional exercise of jurisdiction, ' courts should consider a contract
a sufficient minimum contact that is consistent with due process." Courts,
however, are required to deny jurisdiction, even if a contract exists, if
the court would prevent the defendant from receiving a fair trial." Courts
applying an expansive jurisdictional analysis have established a more ef-
ficient means for determining whether personal jurisdiction exists than
courts applying a restrictive jurisdictional analysis because an expansive
analysis considers the interests of all the parties involved in the suit."
Although the Court's opinion in Campagnie des Bauxites indicates that
a contract satisfies the minimum contact requirements of due process,
the Supreme Court has yet to make a definitive statement concerning
the subject.8 ' Because of the division that exists among courts that have
considered the issue, 8 ' the Court should hear a case involving the ques-
tion and end the confusion that currently exists. 8 '
TERRENCE LEE GOODMAN
... Id. at 2104-2105.
" See supra note 8 (minimum contact guarantees defendant fair hearing). A contract
between a nonresident defendant and a resident of the forum state is consistent with the
protections of minimum contacts because the contract gives the defendant notice that he
may have to defend himself in the forum. See Redish, supra note 25, at 1134 (if defendant
knew in advance that his contact was of jurisdictional significance, defendant was not un-
fairly burdened by litigating in forum).
183 See Redish, supra note 25, at 1134 (defendant not amenable to jurisdiction if signifi-
cantly inconvenienced).
18 See Kamp, supra note 3, at 43 (expansive McGee analysis considers convenience, effi-
cient judicial administration, state regulatory interests). In World-Wide, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that federalism may prevent a forum from balancing the interests of all of
the parties. See World-Wide Volkswagne Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 290,294 (1980) (federalism
could prevent forum from hearing case although defendant not inconvenienced, forum has
strong interest, and forum is most convenient location).
18 See Kamp, supra note 3, at 54 (many years before Court will decide whether con-
tract is minimum contact).
1 See supra text accompanying note 7 (discussion of division that exists among courts).
1 See Kamp, supra note 3, at 45 (Court's approach to jurisdiction leads to uncertainty).
By allowing the circuits to differ on whether a contract is a sufficient minimum contact,
the Supreme Court has lessened the protection of the due process clause. See World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 290, 297 (1980) (due process clause should inform
potential defendants how to structure activity so defendants know when they may be liable
to suit).
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